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Abstract 
Liberalisation has affected all parts of the air travel industry, with airports as well as airlines 
increasingly run on commercial lines.  This paper models interactions between airports and 
airlines to show that, for example, the potential benefits to passengers of increased 
competition between airlines may be (more than) absorbed by the unregulated airports 
through which they travel, and that effecting airport competition in one country may lead to 
the majority of the gains going abroad.  The policy conclusion is that the (de)regulation of 
airlines and associated services should be fully co-ordinated and internationally coherent. 
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1.  Introduction 
In recent years the worldwide trend towards liberalisation and privatisation has made its mark 
on all parts of the air travel industry, with airports as well as airlines increasingly likely to be 
run on commercial lines.  In the UK the process of setting the price controls for the five years 
from April 2003 for the four key airports to which they are currently applied (those 
‘designated’ under the 1986 Airports Act – Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted near London, 
plus Manchester) has sparked calls for the whole regulatory system to be discarded.  For 
example in his recent contribution to this Journal Starkie (2001) argues that complementarity 
between the aeronautical and the commercial services provided by airports gives an incentive 
for “the airport business, left to its own devices, to behave in an economically efficient 
manner” (page 125), and that formal price-cap regulation should therefore be lifted from the 
four airports.  Condie (2000) uses a different argument – that airlines at the London airports 
are in a situation akin to bilateral oligopoly – to reach broadly the same conclusion:  price 
regulation is inappropriate, as “the imposition of formal price caps on this market structure 
merely redistributes wealth from the airport to the airline without any gain to consumers given 
the lack of market access to Heathrow” (page 384).   
 
Indeed, a clear distinction must be drawn between airports like Heathrow and other national 
hubs constrained by a combination of congestion and grandfather rights to timetable slots, and 
the smaller and (often) newer airports where utilisation is well below capacity.  In the latter 
case we would expect any redistribution of wealth to airlines to attract new entrants to that 
sector (which is already liberalised); it is clear from the case studies presented by Barrett 
(2000) that across Europe there is a ready demand for access from low-cost airlines in 
particular.  The large discounts on airport charges cited by Barrett show that the airlines have 
considerable bargaining power in these circumstances, and the benefits of competition in the 
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air travel sector as a whole do seem to be reaching passengers.  At the congested airports 
however it is a different story.  If unregulated, these airports might find themselves in a 
stronger market position than the airlines, and therefore able to erode gains from competition 
between airlines through countervailing increases in airport charges and other commercial 
service charges under their control.  The apparent higher profitability of airports relative to 
most airlines (Doganis, 1992) suggests that this is not an implausible outcome.  It is likely to 
be particularly true for the three London airports which, under the 1986 Act, are under the 
single ownership of BAA, potentially giving them considerable market power.T1   
 
This paper uses a modelling approach to examine the issues for policymaking across the 
whole air passenger industry that are raised by the potential removal of regulatory constraints 
on airports.  The key to the argument is the complementarities that exist between airports and 
the airlines that use them, as opposed to those within airports emphasised by Starkie, but both 
papers underline the importance of ‘joined up’ policy-making which takes account of such 
cross-sector effects.  It is the overall price of a flight – that is, airport charges and other taxes 
as well as the ticket price – that matters to passengers. 
 
A key concern is the potential exercise of monopoly power by airports if the level of 
regulation were reduced.  The next section of this paper therefore considers a simple three-
sector model of air travel between two countries (domestic and foreign), where each country 
has a monopoly airport serviced by two competing airlines (one domestic and one foreign).  
                                                 
1  The decision to allow BAA single ownership of these key airports was based on a number of arguments (see 
Foster (1984) for example);  these included cost considerations and the view that effective price 
competition between airports was unlikely to be effective.  Recently, serious questions have been raised 
about the validity of these assumptions, especially in the light of the activities of Ryanair and other low-
cost operators (Barrett, 2000).   
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We use this model to examine the effects of monopoly airports upon the gains to consumers 
arising from increased competition between airlines.  We then turn in Section 3 to the effects 
of airport competition via the introduction of a rival airport in the domestic country.  We 
would expect there to be gains domestically as the rival airports compete on services such as 
car-parking as well as landing charges, but we show that much of the benefit is likely to be 
appropriated by the remaining monopoly element in the industry – the foreign airport. 
 
Section 4 introduces a government in each country to our model, so that there are now 
potentially five elements to the overall price of a journey:  two government taxes, two airport 
charges and the flight price.  The model assumes that the domestic government introduces a 
flat rate tax designed to maximise government revenue.  The five-sector analysis can be 
extended to the case of a separation of aeronautical and commercial services, as would follow 
from the adoption of a ‘dual till’ methodology in regulation (for some of the recent debate on 
this proposal see Civil Aviation Authority (2001, 2002) or Competition Commission (2002)).  
Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary of the main findings and some suggestions for 
further research.  
 
2.  The Simple Case:  A Monopoly Domestic Airport 
Suppose we have a domestic and a foreign country, each with its own monopoly airport which 
charges passengers on departure an airport charge of  and , respectively.  Further, 
suppose each country has its own airline offering return flights between the two countries (a 
common result of bilateral agreements), whose services are perfect substitutes with uniform 
Dp Fp
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return fare, .  It follows from this that the total cost of travel incurred by each passenger 
for the return trip, P, is given by:
Ap
2
(1) . FAD pppP ++=
Suppose total demand for return air travel between the two countries, Q, is identical in each 
country (so that, for a given price, consumption in each country is Q/2), and takes the linear 
form: 
(2) , PQ β−α=
where  and β  are positive constants.  As both the origin and destination airports service all 
Q passengers, and assuming that both airports operate with constant long-run marginal cost 
(per passenger),  (i = D, F), profit for the i
α
ic
th airport is:3  
(3) .   (i = D, F) Qcp iii )( −=π
Maximising profit with respect to price yields the following first-order condition: 
(4) 0)( =+−=π Q
dp
dQcp
dp
d
i
ii
i
i . 
Using the chain rule (4) can be written: 
(5) 0)( =+− Q
dp
dP
dP
dQcp
i
ii . 
From (2):  
                                                 
2 Although passengers make their travel decisions on the basis of the composite price P, for our purposes it is 
necessary to consider how this breaks down into its constituent parts.  Given the nature of the problem, 
the services of the three sectors are perfect complements. 
3 The simplifying assumption of constant long-run marginal cost is not uncommon in the literature (e.g. Pels et 
al., 1997).  Doganis (1992, p. 49) suggests that unit costs are constant for throughput above about 3 
million passengers per year.  To aid tractability, fixed costs are ignored here; this does not affect the 
nature of our results.   
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(6) β−=
dP
dQ . 
Since total demand is a function only of the composite price, it follows that the firms in each 
sector will take into account the likely prices charged by their counterparts in each other 
sector when setting their own prices.  We characterise this interdependence amongst the three 
sectors as follows:  
(7) ∑
≠
γ+=
gh
hg
gdp
dP 1 ,    ( FADgh ,,=≠ )  
where 
g
h
hg dp
dp=γ  is a conjectural variation term which measures firm g’s expectation of the 
response in  to a change in , and can be interpreted as the implicit collusiveness of the 
industry.
hp gp
4   Assuming all firms hold the same expectation about the reaction of other sectors’ 
prices to a change in their own sector’s price allows us to drop arguments on the conjectural 
variation term, thus: 
(8) γ+= 21
gdp
dP .  ( 15.0 ≤γ<− )5  ( FADg ,,= ) 
Joint profit maximisation across the three sectors is characterised by , whilst lower 
values of represent increasingly competitive pricing behaviour.  Independent pricing is 
characterised by .  Values of 
1=γ
γ
0=γ 0<γ  imply accommodating pricing behaviour. 
 
Using (6) and (8) in (5), we have: 
                                                 
4 Conjectural variation terms have been used to characterise conduct in both theoretical and empirical analyses.  
The approach has its advocates (such as Fraser, 1994, and Bresnahan, 1989), and critics (Shapiro, 1989). 
5 The lower limit on this term is necessary to ensure output in (9) below is greater than zero.  
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(9) 0
)21(
)( =γ+β−−
Qcp ii .  
It follows from (9) that: 
(10) 0
)21(
2)()( =γ+β−+−+=
π+π Qccpp
dp
d
dp
d
FDFD
F
F
D
D . 
Now, since the total number of return trips between the two countries is shared between the 
two airlines: 
(11) ,  (j = 1, 2) ∑=
j
AjqQ
where  is the demand for travel using the jAjq
th airline.  Assuming that both airlines operate 
with common constant long-run marginal cost (per passenger), , profit for the jAc
th airline is:  
(12) . AjAAAj qcp )( −=π
Profit maximisation implies the following first order condition: 
(13) 0)( =+−=π
Aj
A
AjAA
Aj
Aj
dq
dpqcp
dq
d
. 
Using the chain rule (13) can be written: 
(14) 0)( =+−
Aj
A
AjAA dq
dQ
dQ
dP
dP
dpqcp . 
We assume that each airline makes its output decisions based upon an understanding of its 
interdependence with its rival’s output decisions as characterised by:6
                                                 
6 Note, it is assumed that whilst the airlines make decisions on quantity, the final equilibrium is achieved in 
accordance with the fact that both airlines understand the effect that their output decisions will have on 
the sector’s price, and also the reaction to this of the price setting of the other sectors (captured by the 
price conjectural variation term). 
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(15) Akj
Aj
Ak
Aj
Aj
Aj dq
dq
dq
dq
dq
dQ λ+=+= 1 ,   
where  
Aj
Ak
kjA dq
dq=λ  measures airline j’s expectation of the reaction of airline k to a change in 
j’s output.7  Taking to be common for the two airlines, we drop kj arguments on this term.  
Thus: 
kjAλ
(16) A
Ajdq
dQ λ+=1 ,   ( 11 ≤λ<− A ) 
where λA = 1 if there is collusion, λA = 0 represents independent (“Cournot”) behaviour, and 
λA = –1 is the Bertrand outcome with price equal to marginal cost.  Substituting (6), (8) and 
(16) in (14), we have: 
(17) 0
)21(
)1(
)( =γ+β
λ+−− AAjAA
q
cp . 
Thus: 
(18) 0
)21(
)1()(2
2
2
1
1 =γ+β
λ+−−=π+π AAA
A
A
A
A Qcp
dq
d
dq
d
.  
Using (2) in (10) and (18) and rearranging gives: 
(19a) 
)1(2
)()21(
γ+β
β−β−α+γ+β= mAii ppcp ,  ( FDmi ,=≠ ) 
(19b) 
))21(2)1((
)1)(()21(2
γ++λ+β
λ+β−β−α+γ+β=
A
AFDA
A
ppcp . 
                                                 
7Brander and Zhang (1990) examined the performance of a range of duopoly models for explaining the 
behaviour of airlines on US routes, and found that the Cournot model performed best.  See also Oum et 
al. (1993), who found empirical evidence for both quantity setting and Bertrand price competition 
between airlines.  
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Solving (19a) and (19b) simultaneously and using (1) gives the following equilibrium 
(reduced form) expressions for the airline and composite price, respectively: 
(20a) 
)47(
))()(1()23(2
A
FDAA
A
cccp λ+γ+β
+β−αλ++γ+β= , 
 (20b) 
)47(
)5())(21(2
A
AFAD cccP λ+γ+β
λ+α+++γ+β= . 
From these expressions we can derive the two propositions below.   
 
Proposition 1: With a monopoly domestic airport, the composite price is more sensitive 
to changes in (implicit) price conduct amongst the three sectors than to changes in 
quantity behaviour within the airline sector. 8
A
PP
λ∂
∂>γ∂
∂ . 
So, for instance, a move from independent to perfectly collusive pricing amongst all three 
sectors will yield greater benefits in terms of a reduction in the composite price than will a 
move from perfectly collusive output behaviour to independent (Cournot) conduct between 
the airlines. 
 
Proposition 2:  With a monopoly domestic airport, the composite price falls more slowly 
than air fares for small increases in airline competition. 
A
A
A
pP
λ∂
∂<λ∂
∂<0 . 
                                                 
8 The proofs to all propositions are in the appendix. 
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 Therefore, some of the gains from competition between the airlines are absorbed by the 
monopoly airports through increases in their airport charges. 
 
We now briefly consider the possibility that airlines compete on price rather than quantity – 
that is, competition is Bertrand.9  With the airlines behaving in this way, it follows that their 
pricing behaviour will be independent of airport charges, hence 0=γ Ai  (i = D, F).  Further, if 
both airports take AA cp =  as given, 0=γ iA  (i = D, F). 
 
Proposition 3:  From an initial equilibrium with quantity competition between the 
airlines characterised by , and with a monopoly domestic airport, the introduction of 
Bertrand competition in the airline sector (so that 
Aλ
AA cp = can be taken as given), has a 
perverse effect, causing the composite price to rise if:10  
03)1(1 <γ−γ+λ+ A . 
 
The contour in Figure 1 illustrates combinations of Aλ  and γ for which the introduction of 
Bertrand competition is neutral for composite price.  The latter will rise (fall) for points below 
(above) the contour.  For instance, if 0=λ A  and 5.0=γ  then P will rise with the 
introduction of marginal cost pricing in airlines, whilst for 5.0=γ and 1=λA , it will fall. 
                                                 
9 Oum et al.’s (1993, p.183) empirical results suggest this is more likely on more leisure-oriented routes. 
10 Note, it is assumed that γ is not affected by the introduction of Bertrand competition between the airlines.  
However, it may not be unreasonable to suppose that γ might actually increase (i.e. price collusion 
between two sectors is easier than with three).  This would have downward pressure on the composite 
price and would therefore reduce the likelihood of an increase in P.   
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   Figure 1:  Price-neutral Bertrand competition between airlines 
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3.  Domestic Airport Competition 
The assumption of a single domestic airport is clearly too strong in mo
passengers will have some choice of departure point;  indeed unless they l
particular airport they may well be happy to consider a number of options.  Th
reflect the specific case of a break-up of BAA in the UK, which could gi
genuinely competing airports (in addition to Luton and London City), or mo
rise of regional competition to existing airports.  In many cases low-cost 
Ryanair have used secondary airports to establish services in competition 
national carrier from a neighbouring large airport;  examples include Sta
versus Heathrow and Gatwick, Charleroi versus Brussels, and Hahn versus F
2000, page 21).  Equally, some of the secondary airports have set out to att
the chief commercial officer of one low-cost airline, Buzz, has referred to bei
number of UK airports” when opening up a new market (The Independent, 3
page 25).   
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 In this section we model the total number of passengers as being split between two competing 
domestic airports, which are assumed, for simplicity, to be perfect substitutes.  The total 
number of passengers is now split between two competing domestic airports:   
(21) .  (j = 1, 2) ∑=
j
DjqQ
The modelling here is analogous to the case of duopoly airlines.  It follows from (14) that the first 
order condition is: 
 (22) 0)( =+−
Dj
D
DjDD dq
dQ
dQ
dP
dP
dpqcp . 
Using (6) and (8) in (22): 
(23) 0
)21(
)1(
)( =γ+β
λ+−− DDjDD
q
cp , 
where 
Dj
Dm
Dj dq
dq=λ  is a conjectural variation term which characterises output behaviour in the 
domestic airport sector.  Taking this term to be the same for both domestic airports, we can 
drop the mj subscripts. Thus: 
(24) 0
)21(
)1()(2
2
2
1
1 =γ+
λ+
β−−=
π+π DDD
D
D
D
D Qcp
dq
d
dq
d
. 
Using (2) and (1) in (24) and re-arranging, we get: 
(25) 
))21(2)1((
)1)(()21(2
γ++λ+β
λ+β−β−α+γ+β=
D
DFAD
D
ppcp . 
Solving (19a) for F, (19b) and (25) simultaneously, the reduced form equilibrium prices are: 
(26a) 
)46(
))(1()45(
DA
Fsrsr
r
cccp λ+λ+γ+β
β−β−αλ++γ+λ+β= , ( ADsr ,=≠ ) 
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(26b) 
)46(
)(2)44(
AD
ADDAF
F
cccp λ+λ+γ+β
β−β−α+γ+λ+λ+β= . 
From (2), the equilibrium composite price is then: 
(26c) 
)46(
)4())(21(2
AD
ADFAD cccP λ+λ+γ+β
λ+λ+α+++γ+β= . 
The next three propositions now follow straightforwardly. 
 
Proposition 4:  With duopoly domestic airports, the composite price is more sensitive to 
changes in (implicit) price conduct amongst all three sectors than to changes in quantity 
conduct between the airlines, and more so the more collusive the quantity conduct 
between the two domestic airports:  
A
PP
λ∂
∂>γ∂
∂ , 0<
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
γ∂
∂
λ∂
∂
λ∂
∂
P
P
A
D
. 
Therefore, as in the monopoly domestic airport case, the composite price falls more quickly 
with more collusive pricing behaviour amongst all three sectors than it does with 
improvements in airline competition.  However, the superiority of the former is reduced with 
more competitive (output) behaviour between the two domestic airports. 
 
Proposition 5:  With duopoly domestic airports, the composite price falls more slowly 
than air fares for small increases in airline competition but to a lesser extent for less 
collusive behaviour between the domestic airports:  
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AA
A
pP
λ∂
∂<λ∂
∂<0 , 0<
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
λ∂
∂
λ∂
∂
λ∂
∂
A
A
A
D p
P
. 
Therefore, some of the benefits from increased airline competition will be absorbed by the 
domestic and foreign airports, but the extent of this absorption decreases as the domestic 
airports become less collusive.  
 
Proposition 6: With a foreign airport monopoly and duopoly domestic airports, the 
majority of the gains from increasing competition between the domestic airports accrue 
to the foreign country, since:   
0,0 <λ∂
∂>λ∂
∂
D
F
D
D pp . 
 
It follows from the assumptions of symmetry for both airlines and consumers that 
differences in the distribution of surplus between the two countries will depend solely upon 
differences in the margins of the foreign and domestic airports.  Since the foreign and 
domestic airport charges increase and decrease respectively, with competition in the 
domestic airport sector, the surplus accruing to the foreign country must increase relative 
to that for the domestic country.   
 
Proposition 7: With a foreign airport monopoly and non-perfectly collusive output 
behaviour between the duopoly domestic airports ( 1<λD ), the majority of the gains 
from competition between the airlines accrue to the foreign country, since: 
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AF
A
D pp
λ∂
∂<λ∂
∂ . 
 
As in Proposition 6, the surplus accruing to the foreign country from improvements in 
airline competition increases relative to that for the domestic country (where conduct is less 
than perfectly collusive), since the foreign airport charge increases more quickly with 
reductions in .  Aλ
 
Proposition 8:  From an initial equilibrium with quantity competition between the 
airlines characterised by , and with domestic duopoly airports, the introduction of 
Bertrand competition in the airline sector (so that 
Aλ
AA cp = can be taken as given), has a 
perverse effect, causing the composite price to rise if:  
0)2()1(1 <+λγ−γ+λ+ DA . 
 
Figure 2:  Price-neutral Bertrand competition between airlines with  
duopoly domestic airports 
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4. A Policy Warning 
Finally we consider the introduction of taxes and other government levies on 
The potential for raising revenue from air travel has not escaped the attention of 
worldwide, with many levying departure taxes on passengers in a form sim
Passenger Duty in the UK.  In many cases, environmental issues form at leas
motivation for such taxes.  However, such actions essentially add extra deci
sectors to the model, and we show that this raises serious issues for policy-makers
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To illustrate the point we take a simplified model with monopoly airports in both the foreign 
and domestic countries, a monopoly airline and a government sector in each country. We 
assume that the governments introduce a flat rate tax per passenger chosen to maximise 
revenue and that the introduction of the government sector adds no extra costs (the marginal 
cost of raising taxes in this way is zero).  This gives rise to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 9:  If  ( ), the introduction of new revenue generating sectors to the 
n-sector air passenger model with monopoly in each sector leads to an increase (no 
change) in the composite price of travel, even when (when) these new sectors do not add 
to the existing unit cost per passenger, 
1<γ 1=γ
)( FAD cccC ++= :11
01, >∂
∂
<γCn
P , 01, =∂
∂
=γCn
P  
 
Indeed, the warning extends beyond the involvement of governments interested in raising 
revenue.  The analysis here can equally be applied to the issue of the ownership of 
aeronautical and commercial airport services (such as car parking and retail operations).  
Assuming these are perfect complements and that operating costs are independent of 
ownership, the separation of the two functions may cause the total costs of travel to rise.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Our aim in this paper has been to analyse the ways in which changes in one of the sectors 
involved in the provision of air travel can have effects elsewhere in the supply ‘chain’.  In 
                                                 
11 It can be shown that this result is even more robust if we accept that γ may decrease with n (i.e. price collusion 
becomes less easy with more sectors).   
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particular we have shown that the potential benefits to passengers of increased competition 
between airlines may well be absorbed by the unregulated airports at which they begin or end 
their journeys.  In extreme circumstances the net effects for passengers may even be negative. 
 
The main implication for policy-makers from this work is the need for co-ordinated action 
across different sectors involved in producing one end product – here, air travel by a 
passenger from origin to destination.  The different sectors need to be controlled together, as 
regulators cannot assume that their actions in one sector will be neutral elsewhere.  
Furthermore, the possibility that the benefits of regulatory action in one country may be 
(largely) captured by foreign airports or airlines emphasises the case for co-ordinated 
international action such as that undertaken by the European Union or IATA.  Unilateral 
approaches are likely to be less rewarding. 
 
Our prime interest here has been the effects of the complementary nature of airports and 
airlines, and we have therefore abstracted from some important features of many existing 
airports.  In particular we have not considered capacity and congestion issues such as those 
examined by Condie (2000), and nor did we allow for the effects of location and any rents 
which stem from it (see Beesley, 1999).  Both of these would repay further investigation;  the 
former is particularly relevant in the UK context where the principal airport – London 
Heathrow – suffers from severe capacity constraints.  Indeed many passengers from the 
northern part of the UK prefer to make long-haul trips via Schiphol airport in the Netherlands 
rather than Heathrow, thus demonstrating that international borders need not constitute any 
barrier to passengers – nor any barrier to the revenue raised by airport charges.  Where 
passengers can divert to nearby facilities in other countries, as is possible for many European 
airports, the elasticity of revenue with respect to airport charges may be quite high.  The 
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active competition between Hong Kong International Airport and its competitors in South 
East Asia, including 10 and 15 per cent cuts in charges in 2000 and 2001, provides a good 
illustration of this sort of international switching (Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, 2002).  An 
examination of the effects of international substitutability on our model would therefore also 
be of interest. 
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Appendix 
Proof 1:  Differentiating (20b) with respect to  and γ Aλ  yields, respectively: 
(A1) 0
)47(
)5)}(({4
2 <λ+γ+β
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A
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Since  and  it follows that 15.0 ≤γ<− 11 ≤λ<− A γ+>λ+ 21)5(2 A , and thus, from 
comparison of (A1) and (A2), clearly, we have 
A
PP
λ∂
∂>γ∂
∂ .         (Q.E.D.) 
Proof 2: Differentiating (20a) with respect to Aλ  gives:  
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Since , it follows from comparison of (A3) with (A2) that γ+<γ+ 2321
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                (Q.E.D.) 
Proof 3:  Assume the initial equilibrium prices P and  are as given by (20a) and (20b) 
respectively.  With Bertrand competition the new equilibrium price in the airline sector  is 
reduced to marginal cost: 
Ap
Ap
(A4)  , AA cp =ˆ
with 0=γ Ai and 0=γ iA  (i = D, F).  From (7) 
(A5) hg
gdp
dP γ+=1 ,    ( FDgh ,=≠ )  
Substituting (A5) in place of (8) in (10), and using (A4), (19a) becomes 
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(A6) 
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Solving (A6) simultaneously, the reduced form equilibrium prices for domestic and foreign 
airports, assuming marginal cost pricing between airlines, are given by:  
(A7) 
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Using (A4) and (A7) in (1) gives the reduced form equilibrium composite price: 
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Defining  as the change in the composite price due to the introduction of Bertrand 
competition in the airline sector, subtracting (A8) from (20b): 
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which is positive (negative) if γ−γ+λ+ 3)1(1 A  is positive (negative).                   (Q.E.D) 
 
Proof 4:  Differentiating (26c) with respect to  and γ Aλ  yields, respectively: 
(A10) 0
)46(
)4}()({4
2 <λ+λ+γ+β
λ+λ+α−++=γ∂
∂
AD
ADFAD cccbP , 
(A11) 0
)46(
)21)}(({2
2 >λ+λ+γ+β
γ+++β−α=λ∂
∂
AD
FAD
A
cccP .   
Since  and  it follows that 15.0 ≤γ<− 11 ≤λ<− A γ+>λ+λ+ 21)4(2 AD , and thus, from 
comparison of (A10) and (A11), we have
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Proof 5:  Differentiating (26a) with respect to Aλ  yields: 
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Clearly, from comparison of (A13) and (A11), 
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Proof 6:  Differentiating (26b) and (26a) with respect to Dλ , we have respectively: 
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Proof 7: Differentiating (26b) and (26a) with respect to Aλ , we have respectively: 
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From comparison of (A17) and (A18), if the domestic airports do not collude perfectly 
( ), then increases in output competition between the airlines will result in the foreign 
airport charge rising faster than the domestic airport price.                    (Q.E.D) 
1<λD
 
Proof 8:  The initial equilibrium prices, P and , are given by (26c) and (26a), respectively.  
After the introduction of Bertrand competition in the airline sector,  is reduced to marginal 
cost: 
Ap
Ap
(A19)  , AA cp =ˆ
From (7): 
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Substituting (A20) in place of (8) in (23), and using (A19), (25) and (26b) become 
respectively: 
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Solving (A21) and (A22) simultaneously, yields the reduced form equilibrium prices for 
domestic and foreign airports assuming marginal cost pricing between airlines, respectively:  
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Using (A21), (A23) and (A24) in (1) gives the reduced form equilibrium composite price: 
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Defining  as the change in the composite price due to the introduction of Bertrand 
competition in the airline sector, subtracting (A25) from (26c): 
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Proof 9: With n sectors and symmetric price conjectures, from (7): 
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Assuming each sector is characterised by profit-maximising monopoly (equivalent to revenue 
maximisation for government sectors with zero costs), from (9): 
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Summing (A28) for all g: 
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Using (2) in (A29): 
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Differentiating (A30) with respect to n: 
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               (Q.E.D.) 
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